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Abstract
We propose the realized systemic risk beta as a measure for financial companies’
contribution to systemic risk given network interdependence between firms’ tail risk
exposures. Conditional on statistically pre-identified network spillover effects and
market and balance sheet information, we define the realized systemic risk beta as
the total time-varying marginal effect of a firm’s Value-at-risk (VaR) on the system’s
VaR. Suitable statistical inference reveals a multitude of relevant risk spillover chan-
nels and determines companies’ systemic importance in the U.S. financial system.
Our approach can be used to monitor companies’ systemic importance allowing for
a transparent macroprudential regulation.
Keywords: Systemic risk contribution, systemic risk network, Value at Risk, net-
work topology, two-step quantile regression, time-varying parameters
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The financial crisis 2007-2009 has shown that cross-sectional dependencies between as-
sets and credit exposures can cause even small risks of individual banks to cascade and
build up to a substantial threat for the stability of an entire financial system.1 Under certain
economic conditions, company-specific risk cannot be appropriately assessed in isolation
without accounting for potential risk spillover effects from other firms. In fact, it is not just
its size and idiosyncratic risk but also its interconnectedness with other firms which deter-
mines a company’s systemic relevance i.e., its potential to significantly increase the risk
of failure of the entire system – which we denote as systemic risk.2 While there is a broad
consensus that any prudential regulatory policy should account for the consequences of
network interdependencies in the financial system, in practice, however, any attempt of
a transparent implementation must fail, as long as suitable empirical measures for firms’
individual risk, risk spillovers and systemic relevance are not available. In particular, it
is unclear how to quantify individual risk exposures and systemic risk contributions in an
appropriate but still parsimonious and empirically tractable way for a prevailing underly-
ing network structure. And there is an apparent need for respective empirically feasible
and forward-looking measures which only rely on available data of publicly disclosed
balance sheet and market information but still account for the complexity of the financial
system.
A general empirical assessment of systemic relevance cannot build on the vast theo-
retical literature of financial network models and financial contagion, since these results
typically require detailed information on intra-bank asset and liability exposures (see, e.g.,
Allen and Gale, 2000, Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet, 2000, and Leitner, 2005). Such data
is generally not publicly disclosed and even regulators can only collect partial informa-
tion on some sources of inter-bank linkages. Available empirical studies linked to this
literature can therefore only partially contribute to a full picture of companies’ systemic
relevance as they focus on particular parts of specific markets at a particular time under
particular financial conditions (see, e.g., Upper and Worms, 2004, and Furfine, 2003, for
1For a thorough description of the financial crisis, see, e.g., Brunnermeier (2009).
2Bernanke (2009) and Rajan (2009) stress the danger induced by institutions which are “too intercon-
nected to fail” or ”too systemic to fail” in contrast to the insufficient focus on firms which are simply “too
big too fail”.
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Germany and the U.S., respectively).3 Furthermore, assessing risk interconnections on the
basis of multivariate failure probability distributions has proven to be statistically compli-
cated without using restrictive assumptions driving the results (see, e.g., Boss, Elsinger,
Summer, and Thurner, 2004, or Zhou, 2009, and references therein). Finally, for regu-
lators it is often unclear, how complex structures ultimately translate into dynamic and
predictable measures of systemic relevance.
The objective of this paper is to develop an easily and widely applicable measure of
a firm’s systemic relevance, explicitly accounting for the company’s interconnectedness
within the financial sector. We assess companies’ risk of financial distress on the ba-
sis of share price information which directly incorporates market perceptions of a firm’s
prospects, publicly accessible market data as well as balance sheet data. As for risk inter-
connectedness only dependencies in extreme tails of asset return distributions matter, we
base our measure on extreme conditional quantiles of corresponding return distributions
quantifying the risk of distress of individual companies and the entire system respectively.
In this sense, our setting builds on the concept of conditional Value-at-Risk (VaR), which
is a popular and widely accepted measure for tail risk.4 For each firm, we identify its
so-called relevant (tail) risk drivers as the minimal set of macroeconomic fundamentals,
firm-specific characteristics and risk spillovers from competitors and other companies
driving the company’s VaR. Detecting with whom and how strongly any institution is
connected allows us to construct a tail risk network of the financial system. A company’s
contribution to systemic risk is then defined as the induced total effect of an increase in
its individual tail risk on the VaR of the entire system, conditional on the firm’s position
within the financial network as well as overall market conditions. Furthermore, by assess-
ing a company’s conditional VaR in dependence of respective tail risk drivers, we obtain a
reliable measure of a company’s idiosyncratic risk in the presence of network spillovers.
3See also Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2009) for parts of the financial sector in Portugal, Elsinger,
Lehar, and Summer (2006) for Austria, and Degryse and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium. A rare exception is
the unique data set for India with full information on the intra-banking market studied in Iyer and Peydrió
(2011).
4Note that the VaR is a coherent risk measure in realistic market settings, i.e., in cases of return distri-
butions with tails decaying faster than those of the Cauchy distribution, see Garcia, Renault, and Tsafack
(2007). In principle, our methodology could also be adapted to other tail risk measures such as, e.g., ex-
pected shortfall. Such a setting, however, would involve additional estimation steps and complications,
probably inducing an overall loss of accuracy in results given the limited amount of available data.
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The underlying statistical setting is a two-stage quantile regression approach: In the
first step, firm-specific VaRs are estimated as functions of firm characteristics, macroeco-
nomic state variables as well as tail risk spillovers of other banks which are captured by
loss exceedances. Hereby, the major challenge is to shrink the high-dimensional set of
possible cross-linkages between all financial firms to a feasible number of relevant risk
connections. We address this issue statistically as a model selection problem in individual
institution’s VaR specifications which we solve in a pre-step. In particular, we make use of
novel Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) techniques (see Belloni
and Chernozhukov, 2011) which allows us to identify the relevant tail risk drivers for each
company in a fully automatic way. The resulting identified risk interconnections are best
represented in terms of a network graph as illustrated in Figure 1 (and discussed in more
detail in the remainder of the paper) for the system of the 57 largest U.S. financial compa-
nies. In the second step, for measuring a firm’s systemic impact, we individually regress
the VaR of a value-weighted index of the financial sector on the firm’s estimated VaR
while controlling for the pre-identified company-specific risk drivers as well as macroe-
conomic state variables. We derive standard errors which explicitly account for estimation
errors resulting from the pre-estimation of regressors in quantile relations. As the gener-
ally available sample sizes of balance sheet and macroeconomic information make the use
of large-sample inference questionable, we provide (non-standard) bootstrap methods to
construct finite-sample-based parameter tests.
We determine a company’s systemic risk contribution as the marginal effect of its in-
dividual VaR on the VaR of the system. In analogy to an (inverted) asset pricing relation-
ship in quantiles we call the measure systemic risk beta. It corresponds to the system’s
marginal risk exposure due to changes in the tail of a firm’s loss distribution. For com-
paring the systemic relevance of companies across the system, however, it is necessary
to compute the induced total increase in systemic risk. We therefore rank companies ac-
cording to their ”realized” systemic risk beta corresponding to the product of a company’s
systemic risk beta and its VaR. The systemic risk beta - and therefore also its realized ver-
sion - is modeled as a function of firm-specific characteristics, such as leverage, maturity
mismatch and size. Accordingly, a firm’s tail risk effect on the system can vary with
4
Figure 1: Risk network of the U.S. financial system schematically highlighting key companies
in the system in 2000-2008. Details on all other firms in the system only appearing as unlabeled
shaded nodes will be provided later in the paper. Depositories are marked in red, broker dealers
in green, insurance companies in black, others in blue. An arrow pointing from firm j to firm i
reflects an impact of extreme returns of j on the VaR of i (V aRi) which is identified as being
relevant employing statistical selection techniques presented in the remainder of the paper. VaRs
are measured in terms of 5%-quantiles of the return distribution. The effect of j on i is measured
in terms of the impact of an increase of the returnXj on V aRi givenXi is below its 10% quantile,
i.e., i’s so-called loss exceedance. The size of the respective increase in V aRj given a 1% increase
of the loss exceedance of i is reflected by the thickness of the respective arrowhead where we
distinguish between three categories: thin arrowheads display an increase up to 0.4, medium size
of 0.4-0.8, and thick arrowheads of greater than 0.8. The thickness of the line of the arrow is chosen
along the same categories. If arrows point in both directions, the thickness of the line corresponds
to the bigger one of the two effects. The graph is constructed such that the total length of all arrows
in the system is minimized. Accordingly, more interconnected firms are located in the center.
its economic conditions and/or its balance sheet structure changing its marginal systemic
importance even though its individual risk level might be identical at different time points.
Our empirical results reveal a high degree of tail risk interconnectedness among U.S. fi-
nancial institutions. In particular, we find that these network risk interconnection effects
are the dominant risk drivers in individual risk. The detected channels of potential risk
spillovers contain fundamental information for supervision authorities but also for com-
pany risk managers. Based on the topology of the systemic risk network, we can cate-
gorize firms into three broad groups according to their type and extent of connectedness
with other companies: main risk transmitters, risk recipients and companies which both
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Figure 2: Systemic relevance of five exemplary firms in the U.S. financial system at two time
points before and at the height of the financial crisis, 2008. Systemic relevance is measured in
”systemic risk betas” quantifying the marginal increase of the VaR of the system given an increase
in a bank’s VaR while controlling for the bank’s (pre-identified) risk drivers. All VaRs are com-
puted at the 5% level and are by definition positive. We depict respective “realized” versions of
the systemic risk beta corresponding to the product of a risk beta and the corresponding VaR rep-
resenting a company’s total effect on systemic risk. Connecting lines are just added to graphically
highlight changes between the two time points but do not mark real evolutions. The size of the
elements in the graph reflects the size of the VaR of the respective company at each of the two time
points. We use the following scale: the element is k·standard size with k = 1 for V aR ≤ 0.05,
k = 1.5 for V aR ∈ (0.05, 0.1], k = 2 for V aR ∈ (0.1, 0.15], k = 3 for V aR ∈ (0.2, 0.25]
and k = 5.5 for V aR ∈ (0.65, 0.7]. Attached numbers inside the figure mark the position of the
respective company in an overall ranking of the 57 largest U.S. financial companies for each of
the two time points.
receive and transmit tail risk. From a regulatory point of view, the second group of pure
risk recipients has the least systemic impact. Monitoring their condition, however, might
still convey important accumulated information on potentially hidden problems in those
companies which act as their risk drivers. In any case, the internal risk management
of these companies should account for the possible threat induced by the large degree
of dependence on others. In particular, assessing their full risk exposure requires net-
work augmented risk measures such as, e.g., our proposed VaR specifications depending
on (pre-selected) network risk drivers. The highest attention of supervision authorities
should be attracted by firms which mainly act as risk drivers or are highly interconnected
risk transmitters in the system. These are particularly firms in the center of the network
which appear as “too interconnected to fail”, but also large risk producers at the boundary
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which are linked to only a few but heavily connected risk transmitters. While the sys-
temic risk network yields qualitative information on risk channels and roles of companies
within the financial system, estimates of systemic risk betas allow to quantify the resulting
individual systemic relevance and thus complement the full picture. Ranking companies
based on (realized) systemic risk betas shows that large depositories are particularly risky.
After controlling for all relevant network effects, they have the overall strongest impact
on systemic risk and should be regulated accordingly. Confirming general intuition, time
evolutions of (realized) systemic risk betas indicate that most companies’ systemic risk
contribution sharply increases during the 2007/08 financial crisis. These effects are partic-
ularly pronounced for firms, which indeed got into financial distress during the crisis and
are (ex post) identified as being clearly systemically risky by our approach. Figure 2 ex-
emplarily illustrates the evolutions of their marginal systemic contributions – as reflected
by systemic risk betas – as well as their exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk – as quantified
by their VaR. A detailed pre-crisis case study confirms the validity of our methodology
since firms such as, e.g., Lehman Brothers are ex-ante identified as being highly systemi-
cally relevant. It is well-known that their subsequent failure has indeed had a huge impact
on the stability of the entire financial system. Likewise, the extensive bail-outs of Ameri-
can International Group (AIG), Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae can be justified given their
high systemic risk betas and high interconnectedness by the end of 2007.
Our paper relates to several strands of recent empirical literature on systemic risk con-
tributions. Closest to our work is White, Kim, and Manganelli (2010) who propose a
bivariate vector-autoregressive system of each company’s VaR and the system VaR. They
capture time variations in tail risk in a pure time series setting which however does not
account for mutual dependencies and network effects. In contrast, our set-up models tail
risk in dependence of economic state variables and network spillovers which automati-
cally account for periods of turbulence when predicting the systemic relevance. Building
on VaR, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) were the first to construct a systemic risk mea-
sure, called CoV aR, with balance sheet characteristics driving individual risk exposures.
Note that CoVaR is conceptionally different two our two-step quantile approach and can
by definition only vary through the channel of individual risk of the considered com-
pany. Moreover, network interconnections are not addressed which we identify as crucial
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for the performance of the model. Our work also complements papers which measure a
company’s systemic relevance by focusing on the size of potential bail-out costs, such as
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2011).
Such approaches cannot detect spillover effects driven by the topology of the risk network
and might under-estimate the systemic importance of small but very interconnected com-
panies. Moreover, while Brownlees and Engle (2011) study the situation of an individual
firm given that the system is under distress, we investigate the reverse relation and measure
the effect on the system given an individual firm is in financial trouble. Both approaches
are justified as they take complementary perspectives and measure different dimensions of
systemic risk. In the same way, we also complement macroeconomic approaches taking
a more aggregated view as, e.g., the literature on systemic risk indicators (e.g., Segoviano
and Goodhart, 2009, Giesecke and Kim, 2011) or papers on early warning signals (e.g.,
Schwaab, Koopman, and Lucas, 2011, and Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab, 2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we briefly explain
the modeling idea and describe the underlying data. Section 2 presents the model and
estimation procedure for individual companies’ VaRs, before discussing results on the
financial network structure. Section 3 gives the second stage, the system VaR model,
including estimation procedure, inference method and empirical results. In Section 4,
we robustify and validate our results by presenting a case study of five large financial
institutions that were affected by the financial crisis, and try to predict their distress and
systemic relevance using only pre-crisis data. Section 5 concludes.
1 Measuring Systemic Relevance in a Network
1.1 Framework
Assessing and predicting dependence between systemic risk and firm-specific risk re-
quires modeling regression relations in the (left) tails of respective asset return distribu-
tions, rather than in the center. This is in sharp contrast to a standard correlation analysis
in (conditional) means which cannot quantify spillovers in tail situations of financial dis-
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tress, and also goes beyond simple descriptive correlations between tails. Tail correlations
do not allow detecting causal dependencies between tails and do not permit forecasting
systemic risk contributions. We consider a stress-test-type scenario for assessing how
changes in individual company-specific risk affect the risk of failure of the entire system
given underlying network dependencies between institutions and market externalities at
the respective point in time. Therefore, our model does not feature a general equilib-
rium framework, but is exclusively designed to provide a practically feasible and reliable
measure of a company’s marginal contribution to systemic risk in the presence of risk
spillovers from other companies. These underlying network linkages between tail risks of
firms in the system must be identified in a first step.
Defining the company-specific asset return as X it , we measure the tail risk of a com-
pany as its conditional Value-at-Risk (VaR), V aRip,t, given a set of company-specific tail
risk driversW(i)t containing network influences from other institutions in the system, i.e.,
Pr(−X it ≥ V aRip,t|W(i)t ) = Pr(X it ≤ Qip,t|W(i)t ) = p (1)
with V aRip,t = V aR
i
p,t(W
(i)
t ) = −Qip,t denoting the (negative) conditional p-quantile
of X it .
5 Likewise, system risk, V aRsp,t, is measured as the conditional VaR of the sys-
tem return Xst obtained as the value-weighted average return of the set of all major fi-
nancial companies.6 To measure the systemic impact of company i, the system VaR is
modeled in dependence of V aRip,t and additional control variables Vt, i.e., V aR
s
p,t =
V aRsp,t(V aR
i
p,t,Vt) = −Qsp,t. Then, we define the systemic risk beta as the marginal
effect of firm i’s tail risk on the system tail risk given by
∂V aRsp,t(Vt, V aR
i
q,t)
∂V aRiq,t
= βs|ip,q. (2)
We classify the systemic relevance of institutions according to the statistical significance
of βs|ip,q and the size of their total effect β
s|i
p,qV aRiq,t. We define the latter as a firm’s realized
systemic risk contribution raising with the system’s marginal exposure to the company’s
5Defining VaR as the negative p-quantile ensures that the Value-at-Risk is positive and is interpreted as
a loss position.
6For details, see Section 1.2.
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tail risk (measured by βs|ip,q) and the firm’s V aRiq,t. Changes in systemic relevance over
time, however, cannot only occur through V aRiq,t but also through the systemic risk beta
β
s|i
p,q which we allow to vary in firm-specific characteristics (see Section 3).7 Note that this
is conceptionally different to CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).
As the VaR is not observable and has to be estimated, a major challenge is to select ap-
propriate significant conditioning variablesW(i)t yielding a flexible but still parsimonious
model specification. We determine the relevant i-specific tail risk drivers out of a large set
of potential regressorsWt containing lagged macroeconomic state variables Mt−1, lagged
firm-specific characteristics Cit−1, the i-specific lagged return X it−1, and influences of all
other companies apart from i, E−it = (E
j
t )j 6=i, by a statistical selection technique as dis-
cussed in the remainder of the paper. We find that these intra-system influences are best
captured via contemporaneous loss exceedances, where the loss exceedance of a firm j is
defined as Ejt = X
j
t 1(X
j
t ≤ Qˆj0.1) and Qˆ0.1 is the unconditional 10% sample quantile of
Xj . Hence, company j only affects the VaR of company i if the former is under pressure.
Since E−it are return realizations and V aRit is a future predicted quantity, this specification
furthermore circumvents simultaneity issues. A model for V aRit based on economic state
variables as well as loss exceedances by construction automatically adjusts and prevails
in distress scenarios under shocks in externalities. This is a clear advantage compared to
pure time series approaches (cp. e.g. White, Kim, and Manganelli, 2010, and Brownlees
and Engle, 2010).
The selection step allows identifying which (and how strongly) loss exceedances of
other companies influence V aRip,t and is crucial for accounting for network dependencies
between companies. As demonstrated in the sequel of the paper, the latter are crucial
for appropriately explaining individual tail risks. Moreover, identifying cross-firm depen-
dencies for each company i is not only essential for appropriately capturing firm-specific
VaRs in a first step but is also crucial for selecting necessary control variables in the es-
timation of βs|ip,q in the second step. In particular, for an unbiased estimate of β
s|i
p,q, it is
necessary to control for any tail risk drivers influencing both V aRsp,t and V aR
i
q. Accord-
ingly,Vt must contain macroeconomic state variables as well as the tail risks (represented
7For ease of illustration, here we skip the time index in βs|ip,q .
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by the VaRs) of all companies which are identified to influence company i. Ignoring these
spillover effects would lead to a biased measure of systemic risk contribution.
The identified risk connections between all firms constitute a systemic risk network.
The latter is not only a prerequisite for the quantification of marginal systemic risk contri-
butions but contains additional valuable regulatory information on potential risk channels
and specific roles of companies as risk transmitters and/or recipients. Accordingly, the
following analysis consists of two steps where in the first step firm-specific VaRs and net-
work effects are quantified (Section 2) before in the second step, systemic risk betas are
estimated while controlling for the (pre-)identified cross-company dependencies (Section
3).
1.2 Data
Our analysis focuses on publicly traded U.S. financial institutions. The list of included
companies in Table 1 (see Appendix B) comprises depositories, broker dealers, insurance
companies and Others.8 To assess a firm’s systemic relevance, we use publicly available
market and balance sheet data. Such data constitutes a solid basis for transparent regula-
tion since timely access on detailed information of connections between firms’ assets and
obligations, is very difficult and expensive to obtain – even for central banks.
Daily equity prices are obtained from Datastream and are converted to weekly log
returns. To account for the general state of the economy, we use weekly observations
of seven lagged macroeconomic variables M t−1 as suggested and used by Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) (abbreviations as used in the remainder of the paper are given in
brackets): the implied volatility index, VIX, as computed by the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (vix), a short term ”liquidity spread”, computed as the difference of the 3-
month collateral repo rate (available on Bloomberg) and the 3-month Treasury bill rate
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (repo), the change in the 3-month Treasury
bill rate (yield3m) and the change in the slope of the yield curve, corresponding to the
spread between the 10-year and 3-month Treasury bill rate (term). Moreover, we utilize
8Companies are distinguished according to their two-digit SIC codes, following the categorization in
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010).
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the change in the credit spread between BAA rated bonds and the Treasury bill rate (both
at 10 year maturity) (credit), the weekly equity market return from CRSP (marketret) and
the one-year cumulative real estate sector return, computed as the value-weighted average
of real estate companies available in the CRSP data base (housing).
Moreover, to capture characteristics of individual institutions predicting a bank’s propen-
sity to become financially distressed, Cit−1, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)
and use (i) leverage, calculated as the value of total assets divided by total equity (in book
values) (LEV), (ii) maturity mismatch, measuring short-term refinancing risk, calculated
as short term debt net of cash divided by the total liabilities (MMM), (iii) the market-to-
book value, defined as the ratio of the market value to the book value of total equity (BM),
(iv) market capitalization, defined by the logarithm of market valued total assets (SIZE)
and (v) the equity return volatility, computed from daily equity return data (VOL). The
system return is chosen as the return on the financial sector index provided by Datastream.
It is computed as the value-weighted average of prices of 190 U.S. financial institutions.
As balance sheets are available only on a quarterly basis, we interpolate the quarterly
data to a daily level using cubic splines, and then aggregate them back to calendar weeks.
We focus on 57 financial institutions existing through the period from beginning of 2000
to end of 2008, resulting into 467 weekly observations on individual returns. This re-
striction has the drawback of excluding companies which defaulted during the financial
crisis. Therefore, to address this issue and to validate and robustify our approach, we
re-estimate the model over a sub-period ending before the financial crisis and including,
among others, the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch that were mas-
sively affected by the crisis.
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2 A Tail Risk Network
2.1 Measuring Firm-Specific Tail Risks
2.1.1 Identification of Tail Risk Drivers
Specifying the VaR of firm i at time point t = 1, . . . , T as a linear function of the i-specific
tail risk drivers W(i)t ,
V aRiq = W
(i)′ξiq , (3)
yields a linear function in return quantiles
X it = −W(i)t
′
ξiq + ε
i
t, with Qq(ε
i
t|W(i)t ) = 0. (4)
If we knew the i-relevant risk drivers W(i) selected out of W, then, estimates ξ̂iq of ξ
i
q
could be obtained according to standard linear quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett,
1978) by minimizing
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρq
(
X it + W
(i)
t
′
ξiq
)
(5)
with loss function ρq(u) = u(q − I(u < 0)), where the indicator I(·) is 1 for u < 0 and
zero otherwise, and
V̂ aR
i
q,t = W
(i)
t
′
ξ̂
i
q . (6)
However, the relevant risk drivers W(i) for firm i are unknown and must be determined
from W in advance. Model selection is not straightforward in the given setting as tests
on the individual significance of single variables do not account for the (possibly high)
collinearity between the covariates. Moreover, sequences of joint significance tests have
too many possible variations to be easily checked in case of more than 60 variables. Since
alternative model selection criteria, like the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) or the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), are not available in a quantile setting, we choose
the relevant covariates in a data-driven way by employing a statistical shrinkage tech-
nique known as the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO). LASSO
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methods are standard for high-dimensional conditional mean regression problems (see
Tibshirani, 1996), and have recently been adapted to quantile regression by Belloni and
Chernozhukov (2011). Accordingly, we run an l1-penalized quantile regression and cal-
culate for a fixed individual penalty parameter λi,
ξ˜
i
q = argminξi
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρq
(
X it + W
′
tξ
i
)
+ λi
√
q(1− q)
T
K∑
k=1
σˆk|ξik| , (7)
with the set of potentially relevant regressors Wt = (Wt,k)Kk=1, componentwise variation
σˆ2k =
1
T
∑T
t=1(Wt,k)
2 and the loss function ρq as in (5). The key idea is to select relevant
regressors according to the absolute value of their respective estimated marginal effects
(scaled by the regressor’s variation) in the penalized VaR regression (7). Regressors are
eliminated if their shrunken coefficients are sufficiently close to zero. Here, all firms
in W with absolute marginal effects |ξ˜i| below a threshold τ = 0.0001 are excluded
keeping only the K(i) remaining relevant regressors W(i). Hence, LASSO de-selects
those regressors contributing only little variation. Due to the additional penalty term
in (7), all coefficients ξ˜
i
q are generally downward biased in finite samples. Therefore,
we re-estimate the unrestricted model (5) only with the selected relevant regressors W(i)
yielding the final estimates ξ̂iq. This post-LASSO step produces finite sample estimates
of coefficients ξiq which are superior to the original LASSO estimates or plain quantile
regression results without penalization suffering from overidentification problems (see the
original paper by Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) for consistency of the post LASSO
step).
The selection of relevant risk drivers via LASSO crucially depends on the choice of the
company-specific penalty parameter λi. The larger λi, the more regressors are eliminated.
Conversely, in case of λi = 0, we are back in the standard quantile regression setting (5)
without any de-selection. For each institution, we determine the appropriate penalty level
λi in a completely data-driven way such that it dominates a relevant measure of noise
in the sample criterion function. In particular, we use the supremum norm of a suitably
rescaled gradient of the sample criterion function evaluated at the true parameter value
as in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). In this sense, number and elements of the set
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of relevant risk drivers are determined only from the data without any restrictive pre-
assumptions. For details on the empirical procedure we refer to Appendix A.2.
Evaluating the goodness of fit of conditional VaR model specifications should take into
account how well the model captures the specific percentile of the return distribution but
also how well the model predicts size and frequency of losses. The latter issue cannot
be captured, e.g., by quantile-based modifications of the conventional R2. We therefore
consider a VaR specification as inadequate if it either fails producing the correct empirical
level of VaR exceedances but also if the sequence of exceedances is not independently and
identically distributed over the considered time period. This proceeding ensures that VaR
violations today do not contain information about VaR violations in the future and both
occur according to the same distribution. This is formally tested using a likelihood ratio
(LR) version of the dynamic quantile (DQ) test developed in Engle and Manganelli (2004)
and described in detail in Appendix A.3. Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and Pelletier (2009)
show that this likelihood ratio (LR) test has superior size and power properties compared
to competing conditional VaR backtesting methods which dominate plain unconditional
level tests (as e.g. Kupiec (1995)).
2.1.2 Empirical Evidence
We estimate VaR specifications with q=0.05 for all companies employing the LASSO se-
lection procedure described in Section 2.1.1.9 Exemplary V aRi (post-)LASSO regression
results for firms in the four industrial sectors depositories, insurances, brokers and others
are provided in Table 2.
The main drivers of company-specific VaRs are loss exceedances of other firms. In
their presence, macroeconomic variables and firm-specific characteristics often do not
have any statistically significant influence and are not selected by the LASSO procedure.
In Table 2, only for Torchmark (TMK) and Regions Financial (RF) regressors other than
cross-firm links are selected. In contrast, VaR specifications of Goldman Sachs (GS),
Morgan Stanley (MS), JP Morgan (JPM) and AIG exclusively contain loss exceedances
9Due to the limited number of observations, we refrain from considering more extreme probabilities.
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Figure 3: Boxplots of backtesting p-values indicating the in-sample model fit of VaR spec-
ifications including macroeconomic regressors only (left) and VaR specifications resulting
from the LASSO selection procedure (7) (right).
from other firms. Particularly the connections between close competitors, such as Gold-
man Sachs and Morgan Stanley and the influence of mortgage company Freddie Mac
(FRE) on AIG correspond are highly plausible and are confirmed by market evidence.
The relevance of cross-firm effects is additionally robustified by testing for the joint sig-
nificance of the individually selected loss exceedances E−it . This is performed based on a
quantile regression version of the F -test of linear hypothesis developed by Koenker and
Bassett (1982). We find that the selected tail risk spillovers are highly significant in all
but very few cases. See Table 3 for an overview of all cross-effects.
The importance of including other companies’ loss exceedances as potential risk drivers
for a company i is also illustrated by a simple comparison of the forecast performance of
our LASSO-selected specifications to a model of V aRi only using macroeconomic vari-
ables as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). According to the employed backtests, spec-
ifications allowing for cross-firm dependencies reveal a strong predictive ability and are
significantly superior to simplistic models including macroeconomic regressors only. Fig-
ure 3 shows the distributions of the backtesting p-values implied by both models. Hence,
inter-company linkages do not only add crucial explanatory power in VaR specifications
but in fact contain the main information for explaining individual tail risk.
Our results show that the major information about cross-company dependencies in tail
risks is primarily contained in contemporaneous loss exceedances E−it . In contrast, alter-
native VaR specifications utilizing corresponding returns X−jt or lagged loss exceedances
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E−it−1 imply significantly inferior backtest performances with the regressors being mostly
not significant in joint F-tests.10 Moreover, linking VaR forecasts and thus predictions
of hypothetical losses to already realized loss exceedances allows measuring mutual de-
pendencies between companies without requiring a simultaneous system of equations in
conditional quantiles. In particular, observed bi-directional relationships between condi-
tional quantiles and realized loss exceedances of different firms (e.g., between Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley) do not reflect simultaneities as feedbacks are not contem-
poraneous: For instance, a highly negative (realized) return of company j increases the
conditional loss quantile and therefore increases the VaR of firm i. However, a higher
conditional VaR of i does not necessarily directly increase the absolute realized loss re-
turn of i but just makes it more likely. Avoiding an explicit treatment of simultaneities
in quantiles while still addressing network dependencies is an important advantage of our
approach.11
2.2 Network Model and Structure
We constitute a tail risk network of the system from individually selected loss exceedances
reflecting cross-firm dependencies. Taking all firms as nodes in such a network, there
is an influence of firm j on firm i, if Ej is LASSO-selected in (7) as a relevant risk
externality of firm i in V aRiq. In particular, if E
j is part of W(i) as its k-th component,
then the corresponding coefficient ξiq,k in ξ
i
q marks the risk impact of firm j on firm i in
the network. If Ej is not selected as relevant risk driver of firm i, there is no arrow from
firm j to firm i.
For each company in the system, the network builds on only directly influencing and
influenced firms and all other companies directly influencing the influenced firms. In the
Bayesian network literature, these constitute a so-called Markov blanket assumed to con-
tain all relevant information for predicting the node’s role in the network (see Friedman,
10All F-test results are available upon request and omitted here for sake of brevity.
11Econometrically it is open how to handle such a system in conditional quantiles in general. In contrast
to relations in (conditional) means, it is unclear how marginal q-quantiles constitute the respective quantile
in the joint distribution under appropriate independence assumptions. Only in lags, restricted to very small
dimensions and under strong assumptions, solutions have been obtained via CaViAR type recursions (see
White, Kim, and Manganelli (2010)).
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Geiger, and Goldszmidt, 1997). An overview of the identified tail risk connections be-
tween all companies is provided in Table 3 reporting which company’s loss exceedance
affects which others’ VaR and vice versa. We observe that the number of risk connections
substantially varies over the cross-section of companies. While some firms such as, e.g. ,
Morgan Stanley, Bank of America (BAC), American Express (AXP) as well as Bank of
New York Mellon (BK), are strongly inter-connected with many other companies, there
are institutions, such as Fannie Mae (FNM), AIG (AIG) and a couple of further insur-
ances revealing significantly less cross-firm dependencies. In order to effectively illustrate
identified risk connections and directions, we graphically depict the resulting network of
companies in Figure 5. The layout and allocation of the network is chosen such that the
sum of cross-firm distances are minimized. Consequently, the most connected firms are
located in the center of the network while the less involved companies are placed at its
boundary.
The resulting network topology reveals different roles of companies within the finan-
cial network. We distinguish between three major categories: The first group contains
companies with only few incoming arrows but numerous outgoing ones and thus mainly
act as risk drivers within the system. These are institutions whose potential failure might
affect many others but, conversely, which are themselves relatively unaffected by the dis-
tress of other firms. Risk management of such firms can therefore be based mostly on
idiosyncratic criteria without accounting too much for influences of the system. For regu-
latory authorities, however, a close monitoring is important as a failure of such a company
can induce substantial systemic risks through multiple channels into the financial network.
Our results show that only few firms belong to this category. Examples are State Street
Corporation (STT), one of the top ten U.S. banks, Leucadia National Corporation (LUK),
a holding company which is, among others, engaged in banking, lending and real estate,
and SEI Investments Company (SEIC), a financial services firm providing products and
service in asset and investment management. Financial distress of these banks obviously
has wide-spread consequences. For instance, State Street reveals spillovers to the finan-
cial services companies American Express and Northern Trust (NTRS), the Bank of New
York Mellon and Morgan Stanley. Leucadia affects Citigroup (C), one of the biggest
banks in the U.S., and Freddie Mac, one of the two largest U.S. mortgage companies.
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Finally, SEI Investments has links to various big institutions, such as Bank of America,
American Express, Morgan Stanley and the online broker TD Ameritrade (AMTD).
The second group contains companies which mainly are risk takers within the system.
These companies are not necessarily systemically risky but might severely suffer from
distress of others and should account for such spillovers in their internal risk manage-
ment. According to Table 3 and Figure 5 these firms are primarily insurance companies.
Examples are Cincinnati Financial Corporation (CINF), a company for property and casu-
alty insurance, Humana Incorporation (HUM) managing health insurances or Progressive
Corporation Ohio (PGR) providing automobile insurance and other property-casualty in-
surances.
The third group is the largest category within the network. It consists of companies
which serve as both risk recipients and risk transmitters which amplify tail risk spillovers
by further disseminating risk into new channels. Due to their role as risk distributors such
companies are key systemic players and should be supervised accordingly. We further
distinguish between strongly and less connected firms. The first subgroup is the most
difficult but most important to regulate tightly. Examples are Goldman Sachs, Citigroup,
Morgan Stanley, AON Corporation (AON), Bank of America, American Express, Fred-
die Mac as well as the insurance company MBIA (MBI), among many others. Bank of
America and Citigroup are among the five largest banks in the U.S. and reveal strong
connections to various other big institutions, such as Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Gold-
man Sachs, American Express, Regions Financial and AIG. Details on the specific role
of Citigroup and Morgan Stanley within the system are highlighted in Figure 6. Morgan
Stanley, with strong links to many companies, such as Goldman Sachs, Bank of America
and the savings bank Hudson City Bancorporation (HCBK), and the insurance company
AON are examples for deeply connected firms located in the center of the network. Like-
wise, Freddie Mac is strongly involved and was particularly affected by the 2008 credit
crunch in the mortgage sector. Accordingly, also MBIA realized severe losses during the
financial crisis due to investments in mortgage backed securities.
The second subgroup might be technically easier to monitor with companies revealing
risk connections with only very few other firms. Still, supervision is not less important
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than for the first subgroup. Examples are Fannie Mae and AIG. Fannie Mae reveals signif-
icant bilateral risk connections to its main competitor Freddie Mac. AIG holds significant
positions in mortgage backed securities and as a consequence is closely connected to both
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Probably due to the same reason, we also observe bilateral
tail risk dependencies between AIG and MBIA. Even though their number of relevant
risk connections within the network is limited, such firms can still have a crucial over-
all impact on the system. In case of the 2008 financial crisis, the dependence between
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as well as their interaction with AIG had severe systemic
consequences.
Figure 7 reveals that it is not sufficient to focus on sector-specific subnetworks only.
Indeed interconnectedness of institutions occurs to a large proportion between industrial
sectors. In these circle layout network graphs, companies are grouped according to in-
dustries with risk outflows for each group being highlighted. We observe that tail risks
of depositories, insurances and others are relatively equally distributed among all other
industry groups. Depositories are most strongly connected and also reveal the strongest
tail risk links among each other. This is in contrast to the other industries where cross-firm
connections within a group are less strong. Moreover, in contrast to other industry cate-
gories, the risk outflow of broker dealers is clearly more concentrated. They particularly
affect big banks such as Bank of America and Citigroup as well as financial service com-
panies such as American Express or SEI. Only very few direct connections to insurance
companies are revealed.
Besides graphical illustration and inflow-outflow categorizations, standard network
characteristics can provide a more comprehensive picture of the interconnectedness and
the role of each node in the system. In Figure 4 we depict firms’ pagerank coefficient (see
Brin and Page (1998)) which does not plainly count links but empirically weights their
importance in an iterative scheme.12 Confirming the visual impression based on Figure
5, the most connected firms are Lincoln National Corporation, AON, Bank of America,
12The key idea is to assign a weight to each node (i.e., a company in our context) which is increasing with
the number of connections to others and the relative importance thereof. The more connected a firm is, the
higher its importance and thus the higher the importance of its neighbor. The computation of the pagerank
coefficient can be understood as an eigenvalue problem which can solved iteratively. For more details, see
Berkhin (2005).
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TD Ameritrade and Morgan Stanley. The graph confirms our finding above that depos-
itories tend to be slightly stronger involved than the other industry groups. Particularly
insurances reflect a separation into a group of highly connected firms, such as Lincoln
National Corp., AON and MBI, and a group of companies being less connected, such as
AIG, Humana Incorp. , Unum Group (UNM) and Cincinnati Financial Corp.
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Figure 4: The left figure displays pagerank coefficients based on the estimated tail risk network
computed as in Berkhin (2005) with ordering of institutions according to sectors. On the right,
pagerank coefficients are plotted versus realized systemic risk contributions for all companies
which are classified as systemically relevant for the years 2000-2008 as in Subsection 3.3. The
solid regression line shows only a small correlation between the pagerank coefficent and the real-
ized beta, supported by the respective R2 of 0.0265 of the regression. Colors and acronyms are as
in Figure 7 above.
Note that pagerank coefficients such as other network metrics can only assess the local
impact and centrality of firms in the network containing relevant but not all information
for judging overall systemic relevance. Therefore, a risk network does not allow to fully
quantitatively assess the systemic relevance of a financial institution. Nevertheless, the
degree of firms’ interconnectedness and the specific topology of the network or corre-
sponding sub-networks allows to identify possible risk channels in the system. These
interlinkages are central but not comprehensive for macroprudential regulation reflecting
the particular role of a firm as risk recipient, transmitter or distributor of tail risk. To ex-
plicitly quantify a firm’s marginal systemic relevance, we propose the concept of systemic
risk betas presented in the following section.
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3 Quantifying Systemic Risk Contributions
3.1 Measuring Systemic Risk Betas
Besides valuable information on financial network structures, the focus of supervision
authorities is on an accurate but parsimonious measure of an institutions’ systemic impact.
We quantify the latter as the effect of a marginal change in the tail risk of firm i on the
tail risk of the system given the underlying network structure of the financial system. In
order to obtain unbiased estimates of this specific marginal effect in the VaR regression
of the system, however, it is sufficient to additionally only control for firms which are
relevant i-specific risk drivers in the network. Conversely, variables unrelated to V aRi
do not affect firm i’s systemic risk contribution.13 Thus, a fully-fledged structural general
equilibrium model is not necessary. Even if correctly specified, an equilibrium setting
would be practically infeasible failing to deliver sufficiently precise estimates given the
high-dimensionality and interconnectedness of the financial system on the one hand and
the limited data availability on the other.
For this reason, we propose estimating systemic risk contributions based on models
which are specific for each firm i as they only control for the i-specific risk drivers. Cor-
respondingly, we estimate the firm-i-specific systemic risk beta βs|iq,p based on a linear
model for the system VaR of the form
V aRsp,t = V
(i)
t
′
γsp + β
s|i
p,qV aR
i
q,t, (8)
where the vector of regressors V(i)t = (1,Mt−1,VaR
(−i)
q,t ) includes a constant effect,
lagged macroeconomic state variables and the VaRs of all companies which are identi-
fied as risk drivers for firm i via LASSO in Section 2.
The systemic risk beta βs|ip,q = βs|i of company i captures the effect of a marginal
change in V aRit on V aR
s
t . It can be interpreted in analogy to an inverse asset pricing
relationship in quantiles, where bank i’s q-th return quantile drives the p-th quantile of the
13See Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Fernández-Val (2006) for a simple Frisch-Waugh-type argument in
quantile regressions.
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system given network-specific effects and firm-specific and macroeconomic state vari-
ables.14 Accordingly,
β¯s|ip,q := β
s|i
p,qV aR
i
t (9)
measures the full partial effect of a tail risk increase of bank i on V aRst . We refer to β¯
s|i
p,q
as the realized systemic risk contribution as it is is computed based on market realizations
and is useful for real-time crisis monitoring. Moreover, scaling systemic risk betas by the
corresponding VaR allows to cross-sectionally compare systemic risk contributions and
to rank banks according to their systemic relevance.
During periods of turbulence, not only banks’ risk exposures change but also their
marginal importance for the system might vary. We therefore allow βs|i being time-
varying. In particular, time-variation occurs through observable factors Zi characterizing
a bank’s propensity to get in financial distress. Accordingly, βs|it should be interpreted as a
conditional systemic risk beta. Basing βs|i on lagged characteristics, makes betas and thus
corresponding systemic risk rankings predictable which is important for forward-looking
regulation. To limit complexity and computational burden of the model, we assume lin-
earity of βs|ip,q,t in firm-specific distress indicators Z
i
t−1,
β
s|i
p,q,t = β
s|i
0,p,q + Z
i
t−1
′
ηs|ip,q, (10)
where ηs|ip,q are the parameters driving the time-varying effects. The case of a constant
systemic risk beta is obviously contained as a special case if ηs|ip,q = 0 and thus β
s|i
0,p,q =
β
s|i
p,q,t = β
s|i
p,q.
We choose Zit = Cit as the firm-specific tail risk drivers since size, leverage, maturity
mismatch, book-to-market ratio and volatility might not only affect a bank’s VaR, but
also directly drive its marginal systemic relevance. As a consequence, systemic risk con-
tributions of two companies with the same exposure to macroeconomic risk factors and
financial network spillovers may be still different as they depend on their balance sheet
14Note that our stress test scenario only studies the immediate effect of an exogenous risk shock in
company i for the system. We do not infer anything about further steps which should then also account for
converse effects of increases of system risk causing firm specific risk to raise.
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structures. The significance of time variation in these quantities can then be statistically
tested for (see Subsection 3.3 below).
Due to the linearity of (10) we can thus write the quantile model (8) for V aRsp with
time-varying βs|ip,q,t in the following form
V aRsp,t = V
(i)
t
′
γsp + β
s|i
0,p,qV aR
i
q,t + (V aR
i
q,t · Zit−1)′ηs|ip,q . (11)
3.2 Estimation and Inference
If firm specific VaRs were directly observable, the magnitude and significance of i-specific
systemic risk betas could be directly inferred from the linear quantile regression (11) in
analogy to (5) with the VaR defined by (1). However, note that the regressors V aRit and
VaR(−i)q,t in V
(i) are pre-estimated as they arise from the first-step quantile regressions as
shown in Section 2. Hence, operationalizing (11) with V̂ aR
i
t and V̂aR
(−i)
q,t as generated
regressors, yields the (second step) quantile regression,
Xst = −V̂(i)
′
tγ
s
p − βs|i0,p,qV̂ aR
i
q,t − (V̂ aR
i
q,t · Zit−1)
′
ηs|ip,q + ε
s
t , (12)
with Qp(εst |V̂ aR
i
q,t, V̂
(i)
t ,Z
i
t−1) = 0 .
With the notation V̂
(i)
, we stress that some components of V(i) are pre-estimated as
V̂aR
(−i)
q . Then, analogously to the first-step regressions in Section 2, parameter estimates
are obtained via quantile regression minimizing
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρp
(
Xst + V̂
(i)
′
tγ
s
p + β
s|i
0,p,qV̂ aR
i
q,t + (V̂ aR
i
q,t · Zit−1)
′
ηs|ip,q
)
(13)
in the unknown parameters. Consequently, the resulting estimate of the full time-varying
marginal effect β̂s|ip,q in (10) is obtained as
β̂
s|i
p,q,t = β̂
s|i
0,p,q + Z
i
t−1
′
η̂p,q
s|i (14)
for given values Zit−1.
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Since V aRiq,t is a function of W
(i), conditional quantile independence in (12) is equiv-
alent to Qp(εst |W(i)t ,W(−i)t ,Zit−1) = 0 where W(−i)t stacks W(j)t for all firms relevant for
company i appearing in V̂aR
(−i)
q,t . Hence, with both quantile regression steps being linear,
inserting (3) into (11) yields a full model for the system’s tail risk in observable character-
istics. However, direct one-step estimation is only feasible if the choice of W(i) and thus
VaR(−i)q,t is still determined in a pre-step from individual VaR regressions. Model selec-
tion based on the full model of V aRs in observables is infeasible since correlation effects
among the huge number of regressors would produce unreliable results. Furthermore, in-
dividual parameters βs|i0,p,q and η
s|i
p,q could not be identified without additional identification
condition Qq(εit|W(i)t ) = 0, implicitly bringing back the first-step estimation. Therefore
we use two-step estimation even if exact asymptotic confidence intervals are larger than
for an (infeasible) single step procedure. In contrast to mean regressions, such results are
non-standard in a quantile setting and are therefore provided in detail in Appendix A.1.
In finite samples, however, asymptotic distributions often only provide a poor approxi-
mation to the true distribution of the (scaled) difference between the estimator and the
true value if sample sizes are not sufficiently large. In case of quantile regressions, this
effect is even more pronounced, since valid estimates for the asymptotic variance have
poor non-parametric rates and thus require even larger sample sizes to obtain the same
precision.
Therefore, we suggest a procedure for testing significance and potential time-variation
of βˆs|ip,q,t which is valid in finite samples. For a given hypothesisH0, we use the test statistic
ST = min
ξs∈Ω0
T∑
t=1
ρp(X
s
t − B′tξs)− min
ξs∈RKB
T∑
t=1
ρp(X
s
t − B′tξs), (15)
with the compound vector of all regressors in V aRs, Bt ≡ (V aRit, V aRit · Zit−1,V(i)t ),
corresponding KB-parameter vector ξs, and Ω0 referring to the constrained set of param-
eters under H0. This test is an adaptation to the quantile setting of a method proposed
by Chen, Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008) for median regressions. Direct operationaliza-
tion of the test is complicated by the fact that the asymptotic distribution of 15 involves
unknown terms, and, secondly, by the nonsmooth objective function of the quantile re-
gression, which causes inconsistency of conventional resampling techniques. Therefore,
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following Chen, Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008) we apply an adjusted bootstrap method,
which is described in detail in Appendix A.4.
3.3 Empirical Evidence on Systemic Risk Betas and Risk Rankings
We estimate systemic risk betas according to (12) with time variation in firm-specific
characteristics (i.e. Zit = Cit). As in the first-step estimations, we choose q = 0.05, i.e.,
we model the loss which will not be exceeded with 95% probability. For notational con-
venience, we suppress the quantile index as we set p = q. Obtained realized systemic
risk betas indeed contain information on systemic relevance beyond a company’s net-
work interconnectedness. This is illustrated in Figure 4 revealing only slightly positive
dependencies between pagerank coefficients and realized systemic risk betas. Thus, more
connected firms tend to be systemically more risky, see e.g. , Bank of America and Amer-
ican Express. With an R2 of 2% in the regression, the relationship, however, is not very
strong indicating that the quantification of a firm’s interconnectedness is not sufficient
to assess its systemic relevance which directly depends on firm-specific and macroeco-
nomic conditions. The latter is captured by realized systemic risk contributions but not
necessarily by pagerank coefficients.
We statistically assess if a company’s risk has a relevant direct impact on the system
by testing for the significance of the respective systemic risk beta. Evaluating whether
β
s|i
t = 0 requires testing for the joint significance of all variables driving a firm’s marginal
impact. Thus, we test the hypothesis
H1 : βs|i0 = η
s|i
MMM = η
s|i
SIZE = η
s|i
LEV = η
s|i
BM = η
s|i
V OL = 0.
Whether marginal effects on the system are indeed time-varying in firm-specific charac-
teristics can be tested by the joint hypothesis
H2 : ηs|iMMM = η
s|i
SIZE = η
s|i
LEV = η
s|i
BM = η
s|i
V OL = 0.
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If this hypothesis is not rejected, we re-specify the systemic risk beta as being constant,
i.e., βs|it = βs|i, re-estimate the model without interaction variables and test the hypothesis
H3 : βs|i = 0 .
We find the majority of firms having a significant systemic risk beta which is classified
as being time-varying in approximately 50% of all cases. In contrast, for approximately
25% of all firms we do not find systemic risk betas which are significantly different from
zero. Table 4 reports the p-values of the respective underlying tests which are performed
using the wild bootstrap procedure illustrated in Appendix A.4 based on 2, 000 resamples
of the test statistic.15 We consider effects as being significant if p-values are below 10%.
Then, a company is defined as systemically relevant if an increase in its possible loss posi-
tion, given all economic state variables and i-specific risk inflows from other companies,
induces a significantly higher potential systemic loss. This requires its systemic risk beta
to be significant and nonnegative.16
Table 5 lists all systemically relevant companies for the period from 2000 to 2008,
ranked according to their average realized systemic risk contributions ˆ¯βs|i. JP Morgan,
American Express, Bank of America and Citigroup are identified as the (on average) most
systemically risky companies. According to our network analysis above, these firms are
categorized into the group of risk amplifiers which are strongly interconnected and should
be closely supervised. To judge the validity and quality of our assessment based on market
data, we compare our results with the outcomes of the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program (SCAP) conducted by the Federal Reserve in spring 2009, right after the end of
our sample period. In this analysis, the Fed could draw on detailed non-public confidential
balance sheet information to classify the 19 largest bank holding companies according to
15Because of multi-collinearity of time variation effects in firm characteristics for systemic risk betas,
the interpretation of individual coefficients η might be misleading. Therefore, we refrain from reporting
respective estimates.
16Since we do not impose a priori non-negativity restrictions, systemic risk betas can become negative
at certain points in time. In a few cases we can directly attribute these effects to sudden time variations
in one of the (interpolated) company-specific characteristics Zit−1 driving systemic risk betas temporarily
into the negative region. These effects might be reduced by linking βs|i in (10) to (local) time averages of
Zit−1. Such a proceeding would stabilize systemic risk betas but at the cost of a potentially high loss of
information.
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estimates of potential lack in capital buffer for covering risks under an adverse macro
scenario. For details, see Federal Reserve System (2009). The financial institution with
the biggest potential lack of capital buffer according to the SCAP, Bank of America,
ranks among our highest systemically relevant companies leading the ranking in June
2008 (Table 6 b). In addition, with Citigroup, FifthThird Bancorp, Morgan Stanley, PNC,
Regions Financial and Wells Fargo we identify six out of eight banks contained in our
database17 which, according to the SCAP results, were threatened by financial distress
under more adverse market conditions. As we could in advance detect systemic riskiness
of the majority of companies that were later found to face capital shortages in the stress
test scenario of the SCAP, this confirms the quality of our method which is entirely based
on only publicly available data.
Average systemic risk betas, however, only provide a rough picture of systemic im-
portance as they aggregate companies’ marginal systemic risk contributions and VaRs
over time ignoring potential changes in the structure of the financial sector. In contrast,
monitoring the evolution of systemic risk beta’s over time provides a more informative
picture on companies’ specific systemic importance and yields valuable feedback from
the market for forward-looking regulation. To illustrate the potential of our approach, we
show the rankings at two specific time points: Table 6a gives the systemic risk ranking for
the last week in March 2007, which was a relatively ”calm” time before the start of the
financial crisis. Table 6b, on the other hand, shows the ranking at the end of June 2008,
shortly before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Comparing the pre-crisis and post-crisis
rankings, we observe clear changes. In most cases, systemic risk betas – and thus the
magnitude of systemic risk contributions – significantly increased during the crisis. This
is particularly observed for American Express, Bank of America, JP Morgan, Regions Fi-
nancial and State Street, among others. Nevertheless, in some cases, as, e.g., for Citigroup
and Morgan Stanley systemic risk contributions even declined.
During the crisis, we detect Bank of America as systemically most relevant. Our esti-
mates indicate that its multiple risk channels in the center of the network, particularly to
Morgan Stanley, American Express, Citigroup, Wells Fargo are systemically critical. Fig-
17Due to a lack of data, we cannot include KeyCorp and GMAC in our analysis which also have been
found to be financially distressed in a critical macroeconomic environment.
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ure 8 shows that Bank of America’s systemic risk beta has been relatively stable before the
financial crisis but significantly dropped after the issuance of the Federal Reserve’s rescue
packages. Nevertheless, its VaR and thus its realized systemic risk contribution strongly
increased during the crisis. Our results also identify AIG as highly systemically relevant.
Before the crisis, AIG was among the largest issuers and holders of credit default swaps
(CDS) and other credit securitization derivatives. Its obviously strong exposure to mort-
gage default risks is reflected by a strong dependence to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae,
among others, as depicted in the network graph in Figure 5. The high systemic relevance
of AIG is illustrated in the upper part of Figure 8 depicting βs|it , V aRit and the product
thereof, β¯s|it . In 2008, AIG faced tremendous write-downs which caused strong increases
of the firm’s VaR and the realized systemic risk contribution β¯s|it . The rescue packages
from the Federal Reserve amounting to USD 150 billion (see Schich, 2009) in Septem-
ber 2008, however, significantly reduced the risk of both AIG’s and the entire system’s
failure. This is indicated by the strong decline of the companies’ systemic risk beta in
Figure 8). Due to the forward-looking character of systemic risk betas, the (anticipated)
bailout has already been incorporated in the systemic risk ranking of end of June 2009
where AIG drops out of the list of systemically relevant companies. This is induced by
strong changes in the companies’ book-to-market ratio driving the systemic risk beta of
AIG into the negative region.
By construction, realized systemic risk contributions β¯s|it might vary over time through
two channels: a time-varying beta, βs|it and a time-varying Value-at-Risk, V aRit. For se-
lected companies, these effects are illustrated by Figure 2 in the introduction. In many
cases we observe increases of realized systemic risk contributions which are mainly due to
rising individual VaRs with systemic risk betas which even slightly decline from 2007 to
2008. Hence, companies’ marginal contribution to the system VaR is widely unchanged
while their exposure to idiosyncratic risk resulting from worse firm-specific and macroe-
conomic conditions has been dramatically increased. See, for instance, the first two com-
panies in the 2008 ranking, Bank of America and American Express which, however,
realize quite different combinations of marginal systemic contributions and idiosyncratic
tail risk levels apparently facing different sources for systemic relevance. In both cases,
the strong increase in VaR can be attributed to tail risk spillovers in the network, with,
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e.g., Bank of America being particularly affected by Citigroup and Morgan Stanley.
In several cases, increasing individual VaRs coincide with rising systemic risk betas. For
instance, Wells Fargo is an example of a company which was not even identified as be-
ing systemically relevant in 2007 but faces a dramatic increase of both its systemic risk
beta and its idiosyncratic tail risk making it highly systemically risky in 2008. Likewise,
State Street, Progressive Ohio and Marshall & Isle (MI) face an increase of both βs|it and
V aRit. Also here, sources for increasing effects can be found in the network structure.
An exception is State Street which does not face significant risk spillovers from other
companies and thus primarily depends on micro- and macroeconomic externalities. As a
result, the company’s high systemic relevance in 2008 is due to the combination of a mod-
erately high systemic risk beta and severe idiosyncratic risk which in turn affect balance
sheets and obligations of other firms. For two central nodes in the network, Citigroup and
Morgan Stanley, however, declining systemic risk betas overcompensate increasing VaRs
resulting in declining systemic relevance.
The results illustrate that realized systemic risk contributions conveniently condense
information on banks’ systemic importance. Though, the underlying driving forces of a
bank’s changed systemic relevance can be quite different. Therefore, only simultaneously
analyzing and monitoring (i) network effects, (ii) sensitivity to micro- and macroeco-
nomic conditions and (iii) time-variations in systemic risk betas provide the full picture
of companies’ specific role in the network and thus build a solid basis for regulatory mea-
sures.
4 Validity: Pre-Crisis Period
In the course of the financial crisis 2007-2009, a number of large institutions defaulted,
were overtaken by others or supported by the government. As for our general empirical
study, we required data for all considered institutions to be available over the entire period
from beginning of 2000 to end of 2008, some of these companies could not be included.
Nevertheless, to validate and robustify our findings, we perform an additional analysis
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by re-estimating the model for the time period of January 1, 2000, to June 30, 2007 and
including the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.
Because of the shorter estimation period, differences between estimated systemic risk
contributions are not as pronounced as in the analysis covering the full time period. There-
fore, as a sharp ranking of companies might not be very meaningful and hard to interpret
in this context, Table 7 rather categorizes firms into groups according to quartiles of the
distribution of realized systemic risk betas. Accordingly, we can distinguish between four
broad classes: Firstly, there are 9 companies with VaRs that significantly influence the
system VaR and are among the 25% largest average realized betas. The most prominent
members of this group are AIG, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan and Gold-
man Sachs. The second group comprises systemically risky companies with significant
systemic impact, whose average realized betas lie in the third quartile of the distribution.
According to the estimates reported in Table 7, these magnitudes reflect a comparably
high systemic relevance.18 Group 2 group contains mainly large depositories and invest-
ment banks including Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and Regions Financial,
but also the mortage company Freddie Mac. Group 3 includes all companies with small
but significant average systemic risk betas, in particular those below the median. Finally,
the ones which, according to the significance test, are not considered as being systemically
risky during the analyzed time period, are collected in Group 4.
In detail, we focus on four companies which were massively affected by the crisis:
Lehman Brothers became insolvent on September 15, 2008, and was liquidated after-
wards. Merrill Lynch announced a merger with Bank of America in September 2008,
which was executed on January 1, 2009. Furthermore, excluding the crisis period itself
may reveal the systemic relevance of the mortgage firm Freddie Mac, which is closely
connected to the second largest real estate financing company Fannie Mae. Both were
placed under conservatorship by the U.S. government during the course of the financial
crisis. Finally, it is interesting to investigate the systemic riskiness of AIG, which faced
major distress during the crisis and whose bailout was very expensive for the tax payers.
As shown by Table 7 (with the specific companies marked in bold), all of these firms be-
18For a better exposition, we multiply all values of realized systemic risk betas with 100.
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long to the group of systemically relevant firms with high or mid-sized average systemic
risk betas.
Table 8 summarizes the results of our empirical analysis for the four case study can-
didates using only the pre-crisis data. Our network analysis reveals that almost all of the
companies are subject to loss spillovers from direct competitors: Freddie Mac is influ-
enced by risk transmissions of Fannie Mae, and vice versa. Despite Fannie Mae’s low
average realized systemic risk beta, this direct bi-directional risk dependence reveals the
company’s systemic relevance. Merrill Lynch influences Citigroup (C). TD Ameritrade
Holding (AMTD) and E Trade Financial (ETFC) are large online brokers which operate
on the same market as Lehman and Merrill Lynch and are identified as significant tail risk
producer and receiver, respectively. Likewise, we identify tail risk dependencies between
Lehman and both Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, being Lehman’s main competi-
tors and the two largest investment banks in the U.S. during the estimation period. AIG
is clearly the most interconnected firm in this case study. Its VaR is affected by the tail
risks of eight competing insurers: Allstate (ALL), Chubb (CB), Hartford Financial (HIG),
Lincoln National Corp. (LNC), MBIA, Marsh & McLennan Inc. (MMC), and Torchmark
(TMK) as well as by Lehman Brothers (LEH). There are mutual spillovers with Citigroup,
ETFC, CNA, HIG, and MMC. Additionally, AIG’s losses have an effect on the VaRs of
another three insurance companies, Aflac (AFL), Humana (HUM) and Unum (UNM).
All four companies of interest have a significant impact on the system. Focussing
particularly on Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, we show the time evolution of their
realized risk betas and VaRs in Figures 9 and 10, respectively. It turns out that the realized
systemic risk beta of Lehman steadily increases from 2005 to 2007. Interestingly, its VaR
only increases in the second half of 2005 but remains widely on the same level afterwards.
Hence, its growing systemic relevance is mainly due to rising marginal effects on the
system and is not reflected in Lehman’s idiosyncratic risk exposure. The jumps in the VaR
(and thus also in the realized risk beta) are induced by relevant loss exceedances which
only occur whenever one of Lehman’s tail risk drivers (e.g., Morgan Stanley) exceeds
his (unconditional 10%) loss quantile. This discreteness reflects the company’s tail risk
sensitivity to loss exceedances of competitors.
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In case of Merrill Lynch, we observe high fluctuations of the realized systemic risk beta
over the analyzed time period. As for Lehman Brothers, we observe clear differences in
the paths of our systemic risk measure and VaR. For example, while its VaR, apart from
some fluctuations keeps returning to the same level, its realized risk beta increases by
more than 100% from mid of 2006 to mid of 2007. Hence, also here, the (realized) sys-
temic risk beta reveals information on the company’s systemic importance which cannot
be detected by an analysis of the VaR solely. This finding strongly backs the usefulness
of our proposed measure.
From these results, which are produced only from pre-crisis data, we can infer that
in June 2007, each of the five financial institutions of interest was classified as being
relevant for the stability of the U.S. financial system. Our findings indicate, firstly, that
bailouts during the crisis were justified for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG. Also a
failure of Merrill Lynch would have led to harsh systemic consequences which could be
prevented by its merger with Bank of America in 2008. Secondly, the increasing sys-
temic importance of Lehman Brothers could have been monitored and thus the impact of
its bankruptcy could have been anticipated to a certain extent. The direct bi-directional
linkage to JP Morgan, as well as the connections to Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs,
which in turn are deeply interconnected, indicate a high risk for contagion as a result of
Lehman’s failure. Furthermore, our estimates show that Lehman’s systemic risk contri-
bution is only slightly lower than that of AIG, while it is substantially higher than that
of, e.g., Freddie Mac. Given these results, bailing out the latter but not the former is not
necessarily justifiable from a systemic risk management point of view. If these results had
existed in advance, more effective regulatory measures could have been performed which
could have helped reducing the extent of the financial crisis.
5 Conclusion
The worldwide financial crisis 2007-2009 has revealed that there is a need for a better
understanding of systemic risk. Particularly in situations of distress, it is the intercon-
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nectedness of financial companies which plays a major role but challenges quantitative
analysis and the construction of appropriate risk measures.
In this paper, we propose a measure of firms’ systemic relevance which accounts for
dependence structures within the financial network given market externalities. Our anal-
ysis allows to statistically identify relevant channels of potential tail risk spillovers be-
tween firms constituting the topology of the financial network. Based on these relevant
company-specific risk drivers, we measure a firm’s idiosyncratic tail risk by explicitly ac-
counting for its interconnectedness with other institutions. Our measure for a company’s
systemic risk contribution quantifies the impact on the risk of distress of the system in-
duced by an increase in the risk of the specific company in a network setting. Both mea-
sures exclusively rely on publicly observable balance sheet and market characteristics and
can thus be used for predictions in a stress test scenario.
Our empirical results show the interconnectedness of the U.S. financial system and
clearly mark channels of relevant potential risk spillovers. In particular, we can clas-
sify companies into major risk producers, transmitters or recipients within the system.
Moreover, at any specific point in time, firms can be ranked according to their estimated
contribution to systemic risk given their role and position in the network. Monitoring
companies’ systemic relevance over time, thus allows to detect those firms which are
most central for the stability of the system. In a case study, we highlight that our ap-
proach could have served as a solid basis for sensible forward-looking regulation before
the start of the financial crisis in 2007.
Our approach is readily extendable in several directions. In particular, although the
financial system is dominated by the U.S, it truly is a global business with many firms
operating internationally. Detecting inter- and intra-country risk connections and mea-
suring firms’ global systemic relevance, should be straightforward with our proposed
methodology. Moreover, whenever additional (firm-specific or market-wide) informa-
tion is available as, e.g., reported to central banks, it can be directly incorporated into
our measurement procedure. The data-driven selection step of relevant risk drivers then
determines if and how it increases the precision of results.
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Appendix A Econometric Methodology
A.1 Asymptotic Results for Two-Step Quantile Estimation
Under the adaptive choice of penalty parameter as described in the text, the LASSO selection
method is consistent with rate OP (
√
K(i)
T log(max(K,T )), and with high probability the coeffi-
cients selected of W, contain the the true coefficients also in finite samples. These results follow
directly from Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). Furthermore, V aRi is consistently estimated
by the post-LASSO method described in the text which re-estimates the unrestricted model with
W(i). In particular, for all q ∈ I with I ∈ (0, 1) being compact,
ξˆ
i
q − ξiq ≤ OP (
√
K(i)
T
log(max(K,T ))), (A1)
since in our setting it is safe to assume that the number of wrongly selected components of W is
stochastically bounded by the number K(i) of components of W contained in the true model for
V aRi (see equation (2.16) in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011)). We write in a slight abuse of
notation YT ≤ OP (rT ), with YT being either OP (rT ) or even oP (rT ) for any random sequence
YT and deterministic rT → 0. Note that in general for T → ∞, both K and K(i) might grow
only extremely slowly in T , such that they can be treated close to being constants implying the
standard oracle bound OP (
√
log(T )
T ) in (A1).
If the true model is selected, we find for the asymptotic distribution of the individual VaR
estimates for any q ∈ [0, 1],19
√
1
T
(
ξˆ
i
q − ξiq
)′ → N (0, q(1− q)
g2(G−1(q))
E[W(i)W(i)
′
]−1
)
, (A2)
where g(G−1(q)) denotes the density of the corresponding error εi distribution at the qth quantile.
This result is standard (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978). For the second step estimates, we derive
the asymptotic distribution analogously to the two-step median results in Powell (1983)
√
K(i)
T
(
(βˆ
s|i
0,p,q, ηˆ
s|i
p,q, γˆ
s
p)
′ − (βs|i0,p,q,ηs|ip,q,γsp)
′)
(A3)
→ N
(
0, Q−1E
[
p(1− p)
f2(F−1(p))
ρp(ε
s
t )−
p(1− p)
g2(G−1(p))
βs|ip,q
′ (
ρp(ε
i
t), ρ
v
p(Zt−1ε
i
t)
)])
, (A4)
19Required assumptions of Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) and quantile analogies to Powell (1983)
are fulfilled in our setting.
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where in the scalar factor, f(F−1(p)) is the density of the corresponding error εs at the pth quan-
tile, the function ρvp of a vector applies ρp to each of its components, and β
s|i
p,q = (β
s|i
0,p,q,η
s|i
p,q). The
remaining main part Q in the variance is given by Q = H ′E[AA′]H with A = (W(i), vec(Zt−1 ·
W(i)
′
),VaR(−i)). Denote by I and 0 identity and null matrices, respectively, and by 1 a vector of
ones of appropriate dimension. Then,
H ′ =

diag(ξiq,2) 0 · · ·0 · · · · · ·0 · · ·
0 diag(ξiq,1) · · ·0 · · · · · ·0 · · ·
0 0 diag(vec(1dz · ξiq ′)) · · ·0 · · ·
I 0 · · ·0 · · · · · ·0 · · ·
0 0 · · ·0 · · · Id(−i)×d(−i)

where dZ is the dimension of Z which is 3 in our application, d(−i) is the dimension of VaR
(−i)
t ,
and coefficients ξiq,2 are those components of ξ
i
q for regressors which appear both in the first and
the second step. Correspondingly, ξiq,1 are coefficients of regressors which just appear in the first
step of the individual VaR regression. Note that in the variance matrix there is a distinction in γ
for parts of V which are also controls in V aRi and VaR(−i)t , which just appear in V aRs.
A.2 Choice of the Company-specific LASSO penalty parameter λi
We determine λi in a data-driven way following a bootstrap type procedure as suggested by Belloni
and Chernozhukov (2011):
Step 1 Take T iid draws from U [0, 1] independent of W1, . . . ,WT denoted as U1, . . . , UT . Con-
ditional on observations of W, calculate the corresponding value of the random variable,
Λi = T max
1≤k≤K
1
T
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=1
Wt,k(q − I(Ut ≤ q))
σˆk
√
q(1− q)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Step 2 Repeat step 1 for B=500 times generating the empirical distribution of Λi conditional on
W through Λi1, . . . ,ΛiB . For a confidence level α ≤ 1/K in the selection, set
λi = c ·Q(Λi, 1− α|Wt),
whereQ(Λi, 1−α|Wt) denotes the (1−α)-quantile of Λi given Wt and c ≤ 2 is a constant.
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The choice of α is a trade-off between a high confidence level and a corresponding high regulariza-
tion bias from high penalty levels in (7). As in the simulation results in Belloni and Chernozhukov
(2011), we choose α = 0.1, which suffices to get optimal rates of the post-penalization estimators
below. Finally, the parameter c is selected in a data-dependent way such that the in-sample pre-
dictive ability of the resulting VaR specification is maximized. (Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011)
proceed in a similar way). The latter is evaluated in terms of its best backtesting performance
according to the procedure described below.
A.3 Backtest for the Model Fit for V aRi
As suggested by Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and Pelletier (2009), for each institution i, we measure
VaR exceedances as Iit ≡ I(Xit < −V aRiq,t). If the chosen model is correct, then,
E[Iit |Ωt] = q , (A5)
where Ωt is the information set up to t. The VaR is estimated correctly, if independently for
each day of the covered period, the probability of exceeding the VaR equals q. Similar to Engle
and Manganelli (2004), Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006) and Taylor (2008), we include a
constant, three lagged values of It and the current VaR estimate in the information set Ωt. Then,
condition (A5) can be checked by estimating a logistic regression model
Iit = α+ A
′
tθ + Ut,
with covariates At = (Iit−1, Iit−2, Iit−3, V̂ aR
i
t−1)′. Denote by I¯i the sample mean of the binary
response Iit and define Flog(·) as the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution.
Then, under the joint hypothesis
H0 : α = q and θ1 = · · ·θ4 = 0,
the asymptotic distribution of the corresponding likelihood ratio test statistic is
LR = −2(lnLr − lnLu) a∼ χ25 . (A6)
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Here, lnLu =
∑n
t=1
[
Iit lnFlog(α+ A′tθ) + (1− Iit) ln
(
1− Flog(α+ A′tθ)
)]
is the unrestricted
log likelihood function which under H0 simplifies to lnLr = nI¯i ln(q) + n(1− I¯i) ln(1− q).
A.4 Bootstrap Procedure for the Joint Significance Test
The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic introduced in Section 3.2,
ST = min
ξs∈Ω0
T∑
t=1
ρp(X
s
t − B′tξs)− min
ξs∈RKB
T∑
t=1
ρp(X
s
t − B′tξs), (A7)
involves the probability density function of the underlying error terms and is not feasible. Further-
more, bootstrapping ST directly would yield inconsistent results. Therefore, we re-sample from
the adjusted statistic
S∗T = min
ξs∈Ω0
T∑
t=1
wtρp(X
s
t − B′tξs)− min
ξs∈RKB
T∑
t=1
wtρp(X
s
t − B′tξs)
−
(
T∑
t=1
wtρp(X
s
t − B′tξˆ
s
c)−
T∑
t=1
wtρp(X
s
t − B′tξˆ
s
)
)
, (A8)
where ξˆ
s
c denotes the constrained estimate of ξ
s, and {wt} is a sequence of standard exponentially
distributed random variables, having both mean and variance equal to one. According to Chen,
Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008), the empirical distribution of S∗T provides a good approximation of
the distribution of ST . Thus, if the test statistic ST exceeds some large quantile of the re-sampling
distribution of S∗T , the null hypothesis is rejected.
The proposed testing method does not require re-sampling of observations but is entirely based
on the original sample. This provides significant gains in accuracy in the two-step regression set-
ting as opposed to standard pairwise bootstrap techniques as a further alternative. A pre-analysis
shows that this wild bootstrap type procedure is valid in the presented form as any serial de-
pendence in the data is sufficiently captured by the regressors in the reduced-form relation not
requiring block-bootstrap techniques.20
20Pairwise block-bootstrap yields block lengths of one according to the standard procedure of Lahiri
(2001). Results are available upon request.
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Appendix B Tables and Figures
Table 1: Included financial institutions in alphabetical order within sectors.
Depositories (21) Others (11) Insurance Comp. (20)
BB T Corp (BBT) American Express Co (AXP) AFLAC Inc (AFL)
Bank of New York Mellon (BK) Eaton Vance Corp (EV) Allstate Corp (ALL)
Bank of America Corp (BAC) Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp (FRE) American International Group (AIG)
Citigroup Inc (C) Fed. National Mortgage Assn (FNM) AON Corp (AON)
Comerica Inc (CMA) Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB) Berkley WR Corp (WRB)
Hudson City Bancorp Inc. (HCBK) Franklin Resources Inc (BEN) CIGNA Corp (CI)
Huntington Bancshares Inc. (HBAN) Legg Mason Inc (LM) C N A Financial Corp. (CNA)
JP Morgan Chase & Co (JPM) Leucadia National Corp (LUK) Chubb Corp (CB)
M & T Bank Corp. (MTB) SEI Investments Company (SEIC) Cincinnati Financial Corp (CINF)
Marshall & Ilsley Corp (MI) TD Ameritrade Holding Corp (AMTD) Coventry Health Care Inc (CVH)
NY Community Bankcorp (NYB) Union Pacific Corp (UNP) Hartford Financial (HIG)
Northern Trust Corp (NTRS) HEALTH NET INC (HNT)
Peoples United Financial Inc. (PBCT) Broker-Dealers (7) Humana Inc (HUM)
PNC Financial Services Group (PNC) E Trade Financial Corp (ETFC) Lincoln National Corp. (LNC)
Financial Corp New (RF) Goldman Sachs Group Inc (GS) Loews Corp (L)
S L M Corp. Lehman Brothers (LEH)∗ Marsh & McLennan Inc. (MMC)
State Street Corp (STT) Merrill Lynch (ML)∗ MBIA Inc (MBI)
Suntrust Banks Inc (STI) Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co (MS) Progressive Corp Ohio (PGR)
Synovus Financial Corp (SNV) Schwab Charles Corp New (SCHW) Torchmark Corp (TMK)
Wells Fargo & Co (WFC) T Rowe Price Group Inc. (TROW) Unum Group (UNM)
Zions Bancorp (ZION)
∗ included only in the case study
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Table 3: Tail risk cross dependencies: For each company, we list loss exceedances selected by LASSO
as regressors for the V aRi-model (q=0.05) (’Influencing companies’) and companies for which the
respective loss exceedance has been selected (’Influenced companies’).
Name Influencing companies Influenced companies
Broker Dealers
ETFC AMTD,GS,MS AMTD,C
GS C,JPM,LM,MS,SCHW BEN,C,ETFC,JPM,LM,MS,SCHW
MS AIG,AON,BAC,EV,GS,HBAN,HCBK,MTB,SCHW,SEIC,STT AMTD,BAC,EV,GS,HUM,LNC,ETFC,SEIC
SCHW AMTD,GS,JPM,NTRS,TROW AMTD,MS,GS,JPM
TROW AMTD,BEN,EV,JPM,LUK,NTRS,SEIC,SNV AON,MBI,MMC,AMTD,AXP,BEN,EV,NTRS,SCHW
Depositories
BAC AON,AXP,C,HBAN,LM,MS,MTB,PBCT,PNC,SEIC,STI,WFC AXP,BBT,C,CMA,HCBK,JPM,LM,MBI,MS,MTB,PNC,STI,WFC
BBT BAC,FITB,MTB,NTRS,STI,TMK,UNP,WFC AXP,BEN,CMA,FRE,MTB,RF,TMK,UNP,WFC,ZION
BK AXP,JPM,MTB,NTRS,SNV,STT,WFC CMA,JPM,NTRS,SEIC,SNV
C BAC,ETFC,FITB,GS,JPM,LNC,LUK,MBI,MTB BAC,GS,JPM,LUK
CMA AON,BAC,BBT,BK,HBAN,RF,SNV,WFC AON,PNC,SNV,ZION
HBAN AON,LNC,RF,STI,ZION AON,BAC,CMA,EV,LNC,MS,PBCT,RF,ZION
HCBK AON,BAC,MBI,MTB,NYB MS,MTB
JPM BAC,BK,C,GS,PNC,SCHW BK,C,GS,SCHW,SEIC,TROW
MI MMC,TMK HIG,MMC
MTB BAC,BBT,HCBK,NYB,SNV,ZION AON,BAC,BBT,BK,HCBK,MS,SNV,WFC,ZION,C
NTRS BEN,BK,LUK,MMC,SEIC,STT,TROW AFL,AMTD,BBT,BEN,BK,HIG,MMC,PGR,SCHW,TMK,TROW,LUK,STT
NYB PBCT,WFC MTB,SLM,WFC,HCBK,PBCT
PBCT HBAN,NYB AON,BAC,CB,NYB,RF
PNC BAC,CMA,STT,TMK,WFC,ZION BAC,JPM,ZION
RF AMTD,AON,BBT,FITB,HBAN,PBCT,STI,ZION AIG,AON,CMA,EV,FITB,HBAN,MBI,SNV,STI,ZION
SLM AON,AXP,FRE,MBI,NYB AON,AXP,BEN,EV,FITB,MBI
SNV BK,CMA,FITB,MTB,RF,ZION BEN,BK,CMA,FITB,MTB,TROW
STI AON,BAC,FITB,LNC,RF,WFC,ZION AFL,AON,BAC,BBT,FITB,HBAN,RF,ZION,CINF,HUM,UNM,WFC
STT AXP,NTRS AXP,BK,NTRS,PNC,MS
WFC BAC,BBT,CB,LNC,MTB,NYB,STI FITB,PNC,STI,AFL,BAC,BBT,BK,CMA,NYB
ZION BBT,CMA,HBAN,MTB,PNC,RF,STI AON,RF,FITB,HBAN,LNC,MTB,PNC,SNV,STI
Insurance Companies
AFL ALL,AON,CNA,EV,NTRS,SEIC,STI,TMK,WFC AXP,CB,EV,PGR,TMK,UNM
AIG FRE,MBI,RF,TMK FNM,MBI,MS
ALL CB,CNA,L,LNC,TMK AFL,PGR,TMK,UNM
AON CMA,HBAN,MBI,MTB,PBCT,RF,SLM,STI,TROW,ZION AFL,BAC,BEN,CMA,EV,FITB,HBAN,HCBK,LM,MBI,MS,RF,SLM,STI
CB AFL,L,LNC,PBCT,PGR ALL,CINF,EV,HIG,L,WFC,WRB
CI CNA,HNT,HUM,LNC HNT,HUM,LNC
CINF CB,MBI,STI AXP,LM
CNA EV,L,LNC,MBI AFL,ALL,CI,L,LNC,MBI
CVH HUM SEIC
HIG CB,L,LNC,MI,NTRS,TMK HUM,LNC,TMK
HNT CI,EV,HUM,LM,LNC,PGR CI,HUM,LM
HUM CI,HIG,HNT,MS,STI CI,HNT
L CB,CNA,LNC,TMK,UNP ALL,AXP,CB,CNA,HIG,LNC,UNM,UNP
LNC CI,CNA,EV,HBAN,HIG,L,MS,SEIC,TMK,ZION ALL,C,CB,CNA,HBAN,HIG,HNT,L,SEIC,STI,TMK,UNM,WFC,CI
MBI AIG,AON,BAC,BEN,CNA,FRE,RF,SLM,TROW AIG,AON,BEN,C,CINF,HCBK,SLM,CNA,LM
MMC MI,NTRS,PGR,SEIC,TROW,UNM MI,NTRS,UNM
PGR AFL,ALL,NTRS,WRB MMC,CB,HNT,WRB
TMK AFL,ALL,BBT,HIG,LNC,NTRS,SEIC,UNM,UNP AFL,BBT,EV,L,LNC,MI,PNC,AIG,ALL,HIG
UNM AFL,ALL,L,LNC,MMC,STI TMK,MMC
WRB BEN,CB,PGR PGR
Others
AMTD ETFC,MS,NTRS,SCHW,SEIC,TROW ETFC,RF,SCHW,TROW
AXP AFL,BAC,BBT,BEN,CINF,EV,L,SEIC,SLM,STT,TROW BAC,BEN,BK,EV,SLM,STT
BEN AON,AXP,BBT,EV,GS,LM,MBI,NTRS,SLM,SNV,TROW AXP,EV,LM,MBI,NTRS,TROW,WRB
EV AFL,AON,AXP,BEN,CB,HBAN,MS,RF,SEIC,SLM,TMK,TROW AFL,AXP,BEN,CNA,FRE,HNT,LM,LNC,MS,TROW
FITB AON,LUK,RF,SLM,SNV,STI,WFC,ZION BBT,C,FRE,RF,SNV,STI
FNM AIG,FRE FRE
FRE BBT,EV,FITB,FNM,LUK AIG,MBI,SLM,FNM
LM AON,BAC,BEN,CINF,EV,GS,HNT,MBI BAC,BEN,GS,HNT,LUK
LUK C,LM,NTRS C,FITB,FRE,NTRS,TROW
SEIC BK,CVH,JPM,LNC,MS AFL,AMTD,AXP,BAC,EV,LNC,MMC,MS,NTRS,TMK,TROW
UNP BBT,L BBT,TMK,L
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Table 4: p-values for the test on significance of systemic risk betas (Hypothesis H1) and for the test
on constancy of systemic risk betas (Hypothesis H2). For the second panel, we include in parentheses
the p-values for the test on significance of systemic risk betas in case H1 is rejected but H2 is not
(Hypothesis H3).
Name pvH1 pvH2 (pvH3)
Companies with significant and time-varying βs|it
AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.001 0.006
AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.002 0.000
BANK OF AMERICA 0.002 0.001
CHARLES SCHWAB 0.019 0.013
CHUBB 0.017 0.015
CIGNA 0.001 0.013
CINCINNATI FINL. 0.010 0.004
CITIGROUP 0.026 0.066
COMERICA 0.016 0.020
FANNIE MAE 0.001 0.000
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.039 0.021
FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.028 0.030
FREDDIE MAC 0.098 0.092
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.001 0.001
HUDSON CITY BANC. 0.043 0.035
HUNTINGTON BCSH. 0.010 0.011
LEGG MASON 0.026 0.060
LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.041 0.016
LINCOLN NAT. 0.062 0.026
M & T BK. 0.033 0.021
MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.003 0.002
MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.020 0.019
MORGAN STANLEY 0.041 0.095
PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.012 0.012
PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.007 0.003
REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.034 0.029
STATE STREET 0.054 0.049
T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.090 0.076
TORCHMARK 0.002 0.001
UNION PACIFIC 0.040 0.035
UNUM GROUP 0.079 0.097
W R BERKLEY 0.007 0.037
WELLS FARGO & CO 0.015 0.027
ZIONS BANCORP. 0.095 0.100
Companies with significant but constant βs|i
AON 0.063 0.192 (0.135)
E TRADE FINANCIAL 0.072 0.160 (0.233)
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 0.014 0.237 (0.047)
NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.040 0.132 (0.088)
SEI INVESTMENTS 0.014 0.115 (0.025)
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING 0.049 0.131 (0.188)
Companies with insignificant βs|i
AFLAC 0.220 -
ALLSTATE 0.114 -
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 0.199 -
BB &T 0.120 -
CNA FINANCIAL 0.410 -
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.257 -
EATON VANCE NV. 0.276 -
GOLDMAN SACHS GP. 0.667 -
HEALTH NET 0.371 -
HUMANA 0.189 -
LOEWS 0.276 -
MBIA 0.235 -
NORTHERN TRUST 0.305 -
PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL 0.105 -
SLM 0.391 -
SUNTRUST BANKS 0.213 -
SYNOVUS FINL. 0.289 -
42
Table 5: Ranking of average systemic risk contributions based on realized systemic risk betas. The third
column lists loss exceedances that are included in the respective company’s V aRi-regression. Estimation
period 2000-2008 Q3. Systemic risk contributions based on time-varying betas are marked by ∗.
Rank Name ̂¯βs|iav · 102 influencing companies
1 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO 1.41 BAC,BK,C,GS,PNC,SCHW
2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 1.22∗ AFL,BAC,BBT,BEN,CINF,EV,L,SEIC,SLM,STT,TROW
3 BANK OF AMERICA 1.01∗ AON,AXP,C,HBAN,LM,MS,MTB,PBCT,PNC,SEIC,STI,WFC
4 CITIGROUP 0.87∗ BAC,ETFC,FITB,GS,JPM,LNC,LUK,MBI,MTB
5 LEGG MASON 0.83∗ AON,BAC,BEN,CINF,EV,GS,HNT,MBI
6 REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.72∗ AMTD,AON,BBT,FITB,HBAN,PBCT,STI,ZION„
7 MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.65∗ MMC,TMK
8 MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.63∗ MI,NTRS,PGR,SEIC,TROW,UNM
9 MORGAN STANLEY 0.62∗ AIG,AON,BAC,EV,GS,HBAN,HCBK,MTB,SCHW,SEIC,STT
10 AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.61∗ FRE,MBI,RF,TMK
11 PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.58∗ AFL,ALL,NTRS,WRB
12 STATE STREET 0.55∗ AXP,NTRS
13 ZIONS BANCORP 0.51∗ BBT,CMA,HBAN,MTB,PNC,RF,STI,
14 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.49∗ AON,LUK,RF,SLM,SNV,STI,WFC,ZION
15 NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.49 PBCT,WFC
16 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.47∗ BAC,CMA,STT,TMK,WFC,ZION
17 FANNIE MAE 0.45∗ AIG,FRE
18 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.34∗ AON,AXP,BBT,EV,GS,LM,MBI,NTRS,SLM,SNV,TROW
19 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.33∗ AMTD,GS,JPM,NTRS,TROW
20 CHUBB 0.30∗ AFL,L,LNC,PBCT,PGR
21 WELLS FARGO & CO 0.28∗ BAC,BBT,CB,LNC,MTB,NYB,STI
22 FREDDIE MAC 0.19∗ BBT,EV,FITB,FNM,LUK
23 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.19∗ CB,L,LNC,MI,NTRS,TMK
24 CINCINNATI FINL. 0.16∗ CB,MBI,STI
25 TORCHMARK 0.12∗ AFL,ALL,BBT,HIG,LNC,NTRS,SEIC,UNM,UNP,
26 UNUM GROUP 0.04∗ AFL,ALL,L,LNC,MMC,STI
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Table 6: Rankings of relevant systemic risk contributions based on estimated realized
systemic risk betas ̂¯βs|it at the specific point in time. Estimated systemic risk betas and
VaRs are listed in addition illustrating the different sources of variation in ̂¯βs|it . Systemic
risk contributions based on time-varying betas are marked by ∗.
a) End of March 2007 (before the beginning of the financial crisis)
Rank Name ̂¯βs|i2007 · 102 βˆs|i2007 V̂ aRi2007
1 CITIGROUP 1.78∗ 0.263 0.068
2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 1.35∗ 0.387 0.035
3 BANK OF AMERICA 1.16∗ 0.304 0.038
4 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 1.05 0.265 0.040
5 MORGAN STANLEY 1.01∗ 0.146 0.069
6 LEGG MASON 0.98∗ 0.205 0.048
7 MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.83∗ 0.222 0.037
8 REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.78∗ 0.202 0.038
9 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.77∗ 0.248 0.031
10 CHUBB 0.74∗ 0.240 0.031
11 AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.61∗ 0.143 0.043
12 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.60∗ 0.143 0.042
13 STATE STREET 0.51∗ 0.114 0.045
14 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.50∗ 0.104 0.048
15 PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.42∗ 0.092 0.046
16 NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.41 0.090 0.045
17 MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.40∗ 0.088 0.045
18 TORCHMARK 0.39∗ 0.173 0.023
19 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.38∗ 0.099 0.039
20 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.26∗ 0.115 0.054
21 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.25∗ 0.042 0.060
22 FREDDIE MAC 0.23∗ 0.057 0.041
23 LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.19∗ 0.057 0.033
24 CINCINNATI FINL. 0.13∗ 0.026 0.050
25 FANNIE MAE 0.09∗ 0.019 0.049
26 UNUM GROUP 0.23∗ 0.045 0.051
27 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.06∗ 0.014 0.043
28 LINCOLN NAT. 0.04∗ 0.010 0.036
b) End of June 2008 (during the financial crisis)
Rank Name ̂¯βs|i2008 · 102 βˆs|i2008 V̂ aRi2008
1 BANK OF AMERICA 2.86∗ 0.186 0.154
2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 2.78∗ 0.278 0.100
3 WELLS FARGO & CO 2.51∗ 0.186 0.135
4 MARSHALL & ILSLEY 2.31∗ 0.516 0.045
5 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 2.22 0.265 0.084
6 PROGRESSIVE OHIO 1.97∗ 0.380 0.052
7 LEGG MASON 1.96∗ 0.137 0.143
8 REGIONS FINANCIAL 1.86∗ 0.107 0.173
9 MARSH & MCLENNAN 1.76∗ 0.471 0.037
10 STATE STREET 1.44∗ 0.171 0.084
11 NY.CMTY.BANC. 1.12 0.090 0.125
12 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 1.09∗ 0.153 0.071
13 CHUBB 1.07∗ 0.176 0.061
14 TORCHMARK 1.00∗ 0.177 0.057
15 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.91∗ 0.149 0.060
16 CITIGROUP 0.90∗ 0.072 0.124
17 MORGAN STANLEY 0.61∗ 0.074 0.083
18 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.58∗ 0.058 0.100
19 UNUM GROUP 0.34∗ 0.033 0.104
20 UNION PACIFIC 0.27∗ 0.047 0.056
21 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.24∗ 0.012 0.201
22 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.17∗ 0.026 0.064
23 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.01∗ 0.001 0.102
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Table 7: Group ranking of systemic risk contributions for the pre-crisis period 2000 - mid 2007.
The upper part, group 1 (’high’), contains companies with significant βs|it and the highest quartile
of significant betas: ˆ¯βs|iav · 100 ∈ [0.5, 1.3]. Group 2 refers to the third quartile (’medium’) with
ˆ¯β
s|i
av ·100 ∈ [0.03, 0.49] and Group 3 to realized systemic risk betas lower than the median value (’small’),
for which ˆ¯βs|iav · 100 < 0.01. Group 4 includes companies not determined to be systemically risky during
the estimation period, i.e., those with insignificant systemic risk betas. Case study companies are marked
in bold.
Systemic risk contributions Companies
Group 1 ’high’ AIG, LEH, MS, JPM, GS,STT, CINF, LM, PBCT
Group 2 ’medium’ FRE, ML, BAC, C, RF, AXP, PNC,CNA, TROW, NTRS
Group 3 ’low’
FNM, WFC, EV, TMK, BBT, AFL, HUM, MI, CMA, BK,
LNC, ALL, HNT, CB, CVH, SLM, ETFC
Group 4
AMTD, AON, BEN, CI, FITB, HBAN, HCBK, HIG, L, LUK,
MBI, MMC, MTB, NYB, PGR, SCHW, SEIC, SNV, STI, UNM,
UNP, WRB, ZION
Table 8: Summary of estimation and test results for the four case study companies: loss exceedances
influencing each company’s VaR, the most important other VaRs influenced, joint significance tests on
β
s|i
t = 0 and estimated average systemic risk contributions and betas. Estimation period: January 2000 -
June 2007.
Name incluenced by main influences overall sign. average ̂¯βs|it · 100 average β̂s|it
FREDDIE AON, BBT, EV, FITB, FNM, HUM, MBI BBT, FNM 0.048 0.38 0.092∗
MERRILL AMTD, CB, CNA, HCBK, L, NYB, WRB C 0.051 0.03 0.030∗
LEHMAN AMTD, AON, BEN, GS, JPM, LM, LUK, MI, MS AIG, AXP, ETFC, JPM 0.041 0.79 0.176∗
AIG ALL, C, CB, CNA, ETFC, HIG, LEH, LNC, MBI, AFL, C, CNA, HIG, 0.026 0.73 0.210∗
MMC, SCHW, STT, TMK HUM, MMC, UNM
∗ time-varying betas
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Figure 6: Full Network graphs of Citigroup (C) and Morgan Stanley (MS) highlighting
risk drivers and risk recipients directly connected to the respective companies with bold
arrows according to the respective size of the effect. Arrows, colors and acronyms are as
in Figure 5. For simplicity, all other links just mark spillover effects without referring to
size. The list of firm acronyms is contained in Table 1.
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Figure 8: The upper three panels depict time-varying systemic risk beta’s, time-varying
VaRs and the product of the two, realized systemic risk beta’s, for American International
Group (AIG). The lower three panels show the respective three time series for Bank of
America (BAC).
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Figure 9: Realized systemic risk betas, i.e., the products of estimated systemic risk betas
and individual VaRs, of Lehman Brothers (LEH, red) and Merrill Lynch (ML, green).
Estimation period is the pre-crisis period, 2000 - mid 2007.
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Figure 10: Estimated company-specific VaRs of Lehman Brothers (upper panel) and Mer-
rill Lynch (lower panel). Estimation period is the pre-crisis period, 2000 - mid 2007.
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